Civil Procedure by McMahon, Henry G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 19 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1957-1958 Term
February 1959
Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Henry G. McMahon, Civil Procedure, 19 La. L. Rev. (1959)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol19/iss2/27
Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Only one case of importance was decided by the Supreme
Court in this area of our procedural law during the past term.
In Superior Oil Company v. Reilly' the court refused to render
a declaratory judgment construing the provisions of the act of
donation by the Rockefeller Foundation to the state of a tract of
marsh land. This tract had been donated for the primary pur-
pose of providing a wild life refuge and preserve, but the act of
donation permitted its leasing by the state for mineral purposes,
with all revenues in excess of the costs of maintenance dedicated
to the development and improvement of the state's public schools
or its public health program. In the act of donation, the United
States was given all reversionary rights in the land. The suit
was brought against the Collector of Revenue of Louisiana, to
whom all severance taxes are paid, and the Registrar of the State
Land Office, to whom all royalty payments under the lease were
payable. Neither the donor, the Rockefeller Foundation, nor the
reversioner, the United States of America, was made a party to
the litigation.
Plaintiff alleged that, since severance taxes paid the state
are used for other state purposes, the payment of severance
taxes on the royalty accruing to the state as mineral lessor might
possibly violate the dedication in the act of donation of the sur-
plus revenues derived from mineral leases to the state's public
school system or its public health program. Plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that, under the act of donation, no sever-
ance taxes were due on royalty to be paid the state.
In the trial court, the defendants excepted on the grounds
that the trial court had no jurisdiction ratione materiae, and
that the plaintiff's petition disclosed no right or cause of action.
The two latter exceptions were sustained. While the opinion of
the appellate court is not express on the point, it is reasonably
clear that in sustaining the exceptions of no right and no cause
of action the trial court relied on the broad holding in Burton v.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 621, 100 So.2d 888 (1958).
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Lester that an action for a declaratory judgment does not lie
when the plaintiff has any other remedy available. The trial
court expressed the view that, under R.S. 47:1576, the mineral
lessee might pay the severance taxes to the collector under pro-
test, and then file suit to recover them on the ground that these
taxes were not due.
The one feature of the case which struck this writer imme-
diately is the fact that indispensable parties to the controversy
were not joined in the action, and that hence the court could not
adjudicate in their absence. Here, without any joinder of the
donor and the reversioner, the court was asked to construe the
provisions of an instrument which directly and immediately af-
fected their interests. Neither the trial nor the appellate court
need have gone any further. This view of the matter was taken
by Chief Justice Fournet and Justice McCaleb in their concur-
ring opinions.
The majority opinion, however, did go further. The action
was dismissed on the ground that no justiciable controversy was
presented, and that therefore the trial court was without juris-
diction. While an excerpt from Burton v. Lester was quoted
with approval, the majority opinion was not pitched on the
proposition that a declaratory judgment could not be rendered
because plaintiff had another adequate remedy available. The
majority view was grounded on the premise that " 'the issue pre-
sented to the court is academic, theoretical, or based upon a con-
tingency which may or may not arise.' ' '3 Particularly signifi-
cant in this connection is the statement in the majority opinion
that:
2. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955). This broad holding not only emascu-
lates the Declaratory Judgments Act but it announces a completely unworkable
rule. The courts have neither the time nor the facilities to investigate thoroughly
the factual and legal backgrounds of each case to determine whether the plain-
tiff may not have some other remedy available. It makes it possible for the
litigants to confer jurisdiction on the courts by not pleading or proving facts
which would disclose the existence of another remedy. See The Work of the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term- Civil Procedure, 17 LOUISIANA
LAW REViEW 379, 382 (1957).
If the proposed new procedural code is adopted the broad holding in Burton v.
Lester, supra, will be overruled legislatively. "No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." PROPOSED LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1871 (Louisiana State Law Institute, 1959). The italicized
language just quoted is taken from Rule 57, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. 234 La. 621, 629, 100 So.2d 888, 891 (1958). The court is quoting from its
opinion in Tugwell v. Members of Board of Highways, 228 La. 662, 679, 83 So.2d
893, 899 (1955), on rehearing.
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"It must be presumed that the officers of the State will
do their duty and it cannot be assumed that the revenues de-
rived by the State from the production on this property when
eventually deposited with the State Treasurer, will be used
either in whole or in part, for purposes other than those stip-
ulated in the deed of donation."14
Two of the Justices dissented from the refusal of the court
to grant a rehearing.
RES JUDICATA
If there is anything in Louisiana law which is not res ju-
dicata, it is the subject of res judicata itself.
The basic civilian rules on the subject are enunciated in Ar-
ticle 2286 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
"The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only
with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The
thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be
founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each
other in the same quality."
Under the common law concept of res judicata, if the cause
of action in the two suits is the same, the judgment rendered in
the first is conclusive of all issues pleaded, or which might have
been pleaded, by the parties in the first suit. Under Anglo-
American law, however, res judicata is supplemented by the
estoppel by judgment, which comes into play when the causes of
action in the two suits are not the same. Under the latter doc-
trine, the prior judgment operates as an estoppel only as to mat-
ters in issue or points controverted and determined in the first
suit.5
As long as the legal profession in Louisiana remained bi-
lingual, and the works of the French commentators remained
available to Bench and Bar alike, the civilian rules of res ju-
dicata were applied without difficulty to the litigated cases. But
when a reading knowledge of French was no longer considered a
professional requisite in this state, the legal literature of Eng-
land and America was drawn into the resulting vacuum, and in-
4. 234 La. at 627, 100 So.2d at 890-891.
5. See Comment, 2 Louisi&NA LAw REvIEw 347, 348-353 (1940).
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creasingly provided the bases for the Louisiana decisions on res
judicata6 In 1940, in Hope v. Madison,7 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana took cognizance of this anomaly for the first time, an-
nounced generally that common law rules of res judicata and
estoppel by judgment would no longer be applied, and overruled
the earlier cases based on Anglo-American precedents. Hope v.
Madison, however, made no clean sweep in its overruling of prior
cases based on common law precedents. The common law "might
have been pleaded" rule was recognized as still applicable to:
(1) petitory actions; (2) partition suits; and (3) injunctions to
arrest the execution process. The clarification of this area of
our law was continued in Quarles v. Lewis," which enforced the
code requirement that the demand in the two suits must be the
same for res judicata to apply. The court disapproved of earlier
Louisiana cases which had ignored this code requirement.9
Much of the good work of the Hope and Quarles cases was
swept away by the five-to-two decision during the past term in
California Company v. Price.' In a prior suit between the same
parties," the plaintiff mineral lessor had deposited the royalties
which had accrued from eight producing oil wells in Plaquemines
Parish into the registry of the court, and had impleaded the
rival claimants of ownership to the "land," who had granted
mineral leases to the plaintiff, to assert their conflicting claims
to the funds deposited. One set of defendants asserted owner-
ship of the "land" under a patent issued by the state many years
ago. The state asserted ownership on the ground that this patent
was null and void since the "land" was the bed of a navigable
body of water, ownership of which was vested in the public in
perpetuity and which could not have been alienated by patent.
The opposing claimants pleaded in bar of the state's contention
the six-year peremption of R.S. 9:5661, providing that a pro-
ceeding by the state to annul a patent must be brought within
six years of its issuance, and that one to annul a patent issued
prior to the effective date of the statute must be brought within
six years of such date. On rehearing, the Supreme Court held by
a four-to-three decision that the state was barred by the statu-
6. Id. at 491.
7. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940).
8. 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14 (1954). The case is discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term - Civil Procedure, 16 LouisI-
ANA LAW REvIEW 361, 366-367 (1956).
9. 226 La. at 86, n. 3, 75 So.2d at 17, n. 3.
10. 234 La. 338, 99 So.2d 743 (1957).
11. California Company v, Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954), 15 Louins-
ANA LAW Rvx'w 463 (1955).
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tory peremption from asserting the nullity of the patent relied
on by its rival claimants.12
In the second concursus proceeding, the mineral lessor de-
posited the royalties accruing from the production on different
wells on the same "land" into the registry of the court, and again
impleaded the rival claimants of ownership to assert their con-
flicting claims to the funds deposited into the registry of the
court. The successful claimants in the first proceeding pleaded
res judicata and estoppel by judgment in bar of the state's re-
newed assertion of the nullity of the patent. The trial court sus-
tained these pleas. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed by a
majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The basis of the majority opinion is the fact that the issue
of ownership, of the "land" had been adjudicated in the first con-
cursus proceeding, and that hence the state was judicially
estopped from renewing this issue in the second proceeding. The
dissenting Justices, on the other hand, relied primarily upon the
code requirement of identity of demands, pointing out that the
demand in the first proceeding was for the royalties which had
accrued from the production from the eight wells then drilled,
while the demand in the second proceeding was for the royalties
which had accrued from the production from other wells.
To appreciate the difference between these two positions,
subtle differences in approach and theory between the compet-
ing common and civil law rules must be recognized. Under civil-
ian theory, the tests of identity to be applied are those of: (1)
parties; (2) demands; and (3) causes of action. Under common
law theory the tests of identity which must be applied are: (1)
parties; and (2) issues. At common law, if the causes of action
are the same, and these tests of identity are met, res judicata
applies; and if the causes of action are not the same, but these
tests of identity are met, estoppel by judgment applies. 3
By much the same reasoning process, and certainly with
greater validity in a civilian jurisdiction, the majority opinion
might have been pitched on identity of demands, rather than of
issues. The majority opinion might have held that the demand
of the state in the first proceeding was for the nullity of the
patent of the rival claimants, and that the state made the same
judicial demand in the second proceeding.
12. Ibid.
13. See Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REViIW 347, 348-353 (1940).
[Vol. XIX
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Unfortunately for the future law of Louisiana, the majority
of the court did not take this position, but instead relied upon the
identity of issues, which could be sustained only through the ap-
plication of common law rules. Capsuled into one short para-
graph is a recognition of the continued application of the com-
mon law doctrine of estoppel by judgment. This re-opens the
floodgates to the future reception of common law precedents on
the subject. In this area of our law at least, Corpus Juris Secun-
dum again becomes more authoritative than the "solemn expres-
sion of legislative will."
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Supreme Court decisions on this subject, once so vitally im-
portant to the legal profession in Louisiana, now assume only
transient importance. The recently adopted amendment to Ar-
ticle VII of the Constitution, 14 reorganizing the appellate courts
of the state and transferring the great bulk of civil appeals to
the intermediate appellate courts, will go into effect on July 1,
1960. The decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of ap-
pellate jurisdiction possess a short-lived importance only.
During the past term the Supreme Court found that it had
no jurisdiction over ten of the cases appealed to it, and trans-
ferred each to the proper court of appeal. None of these decisions
further developed this segment of our procedural law. In each,
the court applied jurisdictional tests which are now well settled.
One, involving the right to qualify as a candidate in a party pri-
mary election, was not susceptible of pecuniary valuation.15 In
another, the property right asserted admittedly had a value less
than the minimum jurisdictional amount. 16 In three, there was
no affirmative showing in the record of the value of the right
asserted. 7 The demands in two other cases, while on their face
sufficient to be within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, were found to be palpably inflated.' In two other ap-
peals, the demands had been augmented by claims which were
14. Adopted on November 4, 1958, pursuant to Acts 1958, No. 561.
15. Janssen v. Second Congressional District Democratic Executive Committee,
235 La. 353, 103 So.2d 472 (1958).
16. Jefferson v. Tennant, 234 La. 994, 102 So.2d 243 (1958).
17. State ex rel. Village of Roseland v. Addison, 233 La. 708. 98 So.2d 160
(1957) ; Smith v. Holland, 234 La. 125, 99 So.2d 49 (1958) ; Holmes v. Wyatt
Lumber Company, 234 La. 510, 100 So.2d 488 (1958).
18. Morgan v. Dixie Electric Membership Corporation, 235 La. 196, 103 So.2d
88 (1958)'; Theodos v. City of Bossier City, 104 So.2d 155 (La. 1958).
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found to be legally untenable, and without foundation in fact.19
In the remaining case, the appealable main demand was below
the minimum jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, although the
reconventional demand, if instituted as a separate suit, might
have been appealed to our highest court. The court applied the
settled rule that the main demand, if appealable, determines the
appellate jurisdiction of the entire case.20
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Although no particularly interesting cases were decided by
the Supreme Court during the past term on the subject of ap-
pellate jurisdiction, nearly all of its decisions on appellate pro-
cedure during this period presented interesting points.
Two appeals were sought to be dismissed on the ground that
the issues presented on appeal had become moot. In the first,2'
the purchasers of a liquefied petroleum gas business sought an
injunction to prevent their vendor from violating a restrictive
covenant in the purchase agreement not to compete with the
vendors in the trade area during a five-year period. The trial
court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the intermediate appel-
late court found that the defendant was competing with the
plaintiff, through a son acting as his father's alter ego, and per-
manently enjoined both from further competition in violation
of the restrictive covenant. The Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the intermediate appel-
late court. Plaintiffs then moved to recall the writ of certiorari
on the ground that the defendant had acquiesced in the judg-
ment sought to be reviewed by selling his second business to a
corporation in which neither he nor his son was interested, and
attached to its motion to recall certified copies of the acts of
sale. The defendant filed an opposition to the motion to recall
the writ, contending that the sale of the business by the son did
not constitute any acquiescence by the defendant in the judg-
ment sought to be reviewed; and alternatively prayed that the
plaintiffs' suit be dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court prop-
erly overruled the motion to recall the writ. However, the court
further held that since the plaintiffs no longer needed injunc-
tive relief, the suit would be dismissed as moot. The opinion does
19. Salvaggio v; Palmisano, 235 La. 202, 103 So.2d 90 (1958) Breaux v.
Simon, 104 So.2d 168 (La. 1958).
20. Ducore v. Gross, 234 La. 11, 99 So.2d 4 (1958).
21. S. & R. Gas Company v. Stephens, 234 La. 13, 99 So.2d 5 (1958):
394 [Vol. XIX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
not set forth sufficient facts to permit a reader to determine
whether the dismissal of the case was justified or not. Ob-
viously, if the plaintiffs acquiesced in the dismissal the decision
was proper. But it appears to the writer that if the plaintiffs
still desired the permanent injunction the suit should not have
been dismissed. If the facts found by the intermediate appellate
court were correct there had been a violation of the restrictive
covenant by the defendant, and the sale of the second business
did not remove the possibility of further competition in violation
thereof.
In the second case,22 the appellate court refused to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the issue had become moot.
Therein, one of the beneficiaries of two trusts appealed from a
judgment of the trial court ratifying the execution and au-
thorizing the delivery of two reforestation contracts by the
trustees. The appellant had been granted a suspensive appeal,
but since she had been unable to post the $100,000 suspensive
appeal bond required, she had perfected only a devolutive ap-
peal. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the issue had become moot, as the two contracts had been
delivered to the other contracting party when the judgment ap-
pealed from had become executory. The court overruled the
motion to dismiss, since the legality of these contracts was at
issue and the delivery thereof to the other contracting party
did not preclude any review of this issue.
In two cases the right of the appellant to appeal was ques-
tioned by a motion to dismiss filed by the appellee. The plain-
tiff in South Lake Realty Corp. v. Board of Levee Com'rs23 had
been unable to pay the full price of certain property purchased
from the defendant, and agreed to retrocede it. The defendant
insisted on retaining some of the funds previously paid it by
plaintiff for taxes due and for interest due on the purchase
money mortgage notes originally executed. As the plaintiff
would not agree to this retention, it was agreed that the de-
fendant would deposit these funds in escrow in a bank "until
such time as a definitive judgment of a Court of original juris-
diction" ordered the reimbursement thereof to the plaintiff. In
the suit which followed, the trial court ordered the reimburse-
ment of the escrowed funds to the plaintiff, and the defendant
22. Guaranty Bank & Trust Company v. Musselman, 234 La. 560, 100 So.2d
507 (1958).
23. 234 La. 6, 99 So.2d 2 (1958).
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suspensively appealed from that judgment. In the appellate
court the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that in the escrow agreement the defendant had agreed to abide
by the judgment of the trial court. The court properly overruled
the motion to dismiss. The reasons assigned therefor, while
close to the principles of law applicable, do not quite hit the nail
on the head. The majority opinion pitched the decision on the
following language:
"Under Article 539 of the Code of Practice, a definitive
or final judgment is a judgment that decides all of the points
in controversy between the parties. Whenever a suspensive
appeal is taken from a judgment, it is not final until a final
decision is handed down by an appellate court. Article 575
of the Code of Practice. '24
One of the Justices concurred in the decree, but took the posi-
tion that in the escrow agreement the defendant waived its right
to a suspensive, but not to a devolutive appeal. The writer finds
it difficult to follow this reasoning. However, it seems clear
that two provisions of our positive law support the majority
decision. A definitive judgment is one which has acquired the
force of res judicata ;25 and a judgment of a trial court becomes
res judicata only after it has been affirmed on appeal, or the
delay for appealing therefrom has expired.26 There was no defi-
nitive judgment of the trial court.
In the second case where the right of the appellant to appeal
was raised through a motion to dismiss the appeal, the court
properly denied the motion. 27 There, a dative testamentary
executrix appealed from a judgment of a district court rejecting
her demands for a judgment against the defendant for a large
sum of money. The motion to dismiss was grounded on the con-
tention that the powers of an executrix without seizin are limited
to the delivery of legacies, the taking of an inventory, and the
performance of similar conservatory acts; and that hence she
was without procedural right to institute and prosecute the suit,
or to prosecute any appeal from an adverse judgment. Since
the basic issue raised by the motion to dismiss was inextricably
connected with the plaintiff's right and interest to sue, the ques-
tion presented was held to be one to be determined on the con-
24. 234 La. at 9, 99 So.2d at 4.
25. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 539 (1870).
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3546(31) (1870).
27. Jones v. Jones, 234 La. 549, 100 So.2d 502 (1958).
[Vol. XIX
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sideration of the appeal on its merits. The case is readily dis-
tinguishable from those involving the acquiescence in the judg-
ment appealed from by the appellant, failure to take the appeal
timely, and other instances of the loss of the right of appeal.
During the past term three cases, quite properly decided by
the appellate court under existing rules of procedure, illustrate
vividly the simplification and elimination of technical rules
which will be effected when the proposed new procedural code
is adopted.
In Love v. Department of Highways2 the appeal was dis-
missed because of the failure of the appellant to lodge the
transcript in the appellate court on or before the return day
originally assigned by the trial court, or within the three days
of grace thereof. The duty of filing the transcript in the ap-
pellate court was held to be that of the appellant, and not of
the clerk of the trial court. An attempted extension of the re-
turn day by the trial court was held ineffective on the ground
that its jurisdiction had been divested when the appeal was
perfected. Under the proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure there would have been no dfsmissal of the appeal. The
proposed new code imposes the duty of lodging the transcript
of appeal on the clerk of the trial court ;29 and the trial court
retains jurisdiction to extend the return day, on application of
its clerk or the appellant.3 0
In Marek v. McHardy,31 the appellant had prayed for the
issuance of a citation of appeal on the appellee, and the trial
court had ordered it. The clerk failed to issue the citation until
after the transcript had been lodged in the Supreme Court.
Faced with the settled rule that the appeal will not be dismissed
when the citation of appeal had been prayed for but the clerk
failed to issue it, the appellant presented a novel argument to
support his motion to dismiss. It was contended that, although
the clerk of the trial court issued the citation, he did so after the
jurisdiction of the trial court had been divested, and that there-
fore the citation of appeal was without effect. This novel argu-
ment was promptly swept aside by the court, which pointed out
that it was the mandatory duty of the trial court clerk to issue
28. 234 La. 825, 101 So.2d 683 (1958).
29. PROPOsED LA. CODE OF CiviL PRocEDuaE art. 2127 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1959).
30. Id. arts. 2088, 2125.
31. 233 La. 835, 98 So.2d 207 (1957).
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the citation when prayed for, and the appeal would not be dis-
missed because of any irregularity imputable to the clerk.
In a second case on the same subject,82 before the return day
the appellant moved in the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal
because of a failure to issue and serve a required citation of
appeal. Prior to a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the clerk
of the trial court issued and the sheriff served the citation of
appeal. The motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that
the failure of the appellant to pray for the issuance of citation,
the failure of the trial court to order it, and the failure of the
trial court clerk to issue the citation before were all irregularities
which were cured by the issuance and service of the citation
before the transcript was lodged in the appellate court.
Under the proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure the
appellate courts will not have to waste time considering and dis-
posing of technical points of this character. Citations of appeal
are abolished; the clerk of the trial court is required in all cases
to mail notices of the appeal to all appellees; and the clerk's
failure to mail the required notice does not prejudice the ap-
peal.3 8
A novel and interesting point was decided in Thibodeaux v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.3 4 The case originally had been
appealed to a court of appeal, and the latter finding itself with-
out jurisdiction, on May 2, 1957, transferred the appeal to the
Supreme Court. The judgment ordering the transfer conditioned
it on the lodging of the transcript of appeal in the Supreme
Court within "30 days from the date of finality of this judg-
ment." Both parties applied to the intermediate appellate court
for a rehearing, and both applications were denied on June 4,
1957. The transcript of appeal was lodged in the Supreme Court
on July 24, 1957. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the transcript was not filed timely. The motion
to dismiss was denied on the ground that, under the constitu-
tional provision regulating applications for writs of certiorari
to the Supreme Court,83 the judgment of the intermediate ap-
pellate court did not become final until the expiration of thirty
days from the date it denied a rehearing. The transcript was
32. Cameron v. Reserve Insurance Company, 233 La. 704, 98 So.2d 159 (1957).
33. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVrL 'PROCEDURE art. 2121 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1959).
34. 233 La. 804, 98 So.2d 195 (1957).
35. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 11. ,
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lodged in the Supreme Court within thirty days of the date the
court of appeal judgment became final.
JUDICIAL SALES
Two interesting points were presented in Lambert v. Bond,36
where the adjudicatee at a judicial sale under a writ of fieri
facias sought to confirm the sale in a monition proceeding. The
trial court rendered a judgment of confirmation, from which
only the judgment debtor appealed. The first ground of nullity
of the judicial sale asserted is interesting but without merit. It
was contended that the sale was null for the reason that the
sheriff, in reading the required mortgage certificate, had read
the inscription of a $9,000 first mortgage on the property, while
actually the balance due thereon was only $6,500. Since the price
of adjudication was adequate to clear all mortgages and privi-
leges on the property priming the right of the seizing creditor,
the court overruled this contention.
The appellant's second contention on appeal was both more
serious and more successful. In the judicial advertisement of
the sale the sheriff had not set out a full description of the
property, but had used only the description "Especially Lot No. 5
and a portion of Lot No. 6 of the Lanier Addition to the Town
of Jonesville, Catahoula Parish." No reference was made in this
advertisement to any plat or recorded conveyance which might
supplement this description. The appellee objected to the court's
consideration of this ground of nullity as it had not been asserted
and relied on by the appellant in the court below. The court
overruled this objection for two reasons. Firstly, the point had
been urged by another defendant who had failed to appeal, and
had been considered by the trial court. Secondly, it was pointed
out that in a monition proceeding the court was required to
satisfy itself of the sufficiency of the description of the prop-
erty judicially sold. For argument's sake, the Supreme Court
conceded that in a petitory action brought by an adjudicatee
who had been in possession of the property for more than two
years it might hold the insufficiency of the description a relative
nullity cured by prescription. But it was held that in a monition
proceeding the only issue is the validity vel non of the judicial
sale. As the description of the property in the judicial advertise-
ment had not furnished adequate information to enable a pros-
36. 234 La. 1092, 102 So.2d 467 (1958).
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pective purchaser to bid thereon intelligently, the judicial sale
was annulled.
MISCELLANEOUS
One of the basic articles8 7 of the Code of Practice provides
that "In all actions which are to be brought at the end of a stated
period, the right of action subsists until the last day has ex-
pired." In Mansur v. Abrahams the Supreme Court held that
when the last day of a term allowed by law for the institution
of an action falls on a holiday, the action is instituted timely if
filed on the next legal day. Under R.S. 1:55, in many parishes
of the state, Saturday is a half-holiday, on the morning of which
the courts are open and suits may be filed. This presents a prob-
lem in the computation of the time within which an action may
be instituted, or a procedural step taken, when the last day of
the term falls on a Saturday. In Frank v. Currie,39 the Court of
Appeal for the Parish of Orleans held that Saturday must be
considered as an excluded holiday in computing the delay al-
lowed a defendant to answer. Dicta to the effect that Saturday
must be treated as a holiday in the computation of procedural
delays were to be found in at least two Supreme Court cases ;40
but the question of whether Saturday should be excluded if it
was the last day of the term allowed by law for the institution
of an action was not squarely decided until the past term.
In Hebert v. Spano41 the plaintiffs in four suits consolidated
for trial on Monday, April 4, 1955, judicially demanded damages
for wrongful death resulting from an accident which occurred
on April 2, 1954. Sunday, being a holiday, obviously had to be
excluded in determining whether the defendant's exception of
prescription of one year was well taken. The trial court further
held that since Saturday, April 2, 1955 was a half-holiday, it
likewise should be excluded. The intermediate appellate court
37. Art. 16.
38. 183 La. 634, 164 So. 421 (1935). See also State ex rel. Marcade v. City
of New Orleans, 216 La. 587, 44 So.2d 305 (1949) ; Bergeron v. Rappelet, 212
La. 717, 33 So.2d 207 (1947) ; Folse v. Dale, 194 La. 180, 193 So. 581 (1940) ;
State ex rel. Graham v. Republican State Central Committee, 193 La. 863, 192
So. 374 (1939).
39. 172 So. 843 (La. App. 1937).
40. See Vicknair v. Vicknair, 211 La. 159, 29 So.2d 706 (1947) and Evans v.
Hamner, 209 La. 442, 24 So.2d 814 (1946). For discussions of the subject, see
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term- Procedure,
7 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 262, 270 n.31 (1947) ; The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term- Civil Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LAW
REvIaw 261, 273 (1948).
41. 233 La. 813, 98 So.2d 199 (1957).
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certified the question to the Supreme Court for an answer.
The latter held that a Saturday half-holiday must be excluded
in the computation of the year allowed the plaintiffs to institute
suit, when it fell on the last day of that year.
The proposed new procedural code has anticipated the ques-
tion, and expressly reaches the same conclusion. 42
The Forma Pauperis Act provides that if the party litigating
under the benefit of the statute is cast in judgment "he shall be
condemned to pay the costs incurred by him and the costs re-
coverable by the other parties to the action. ' 43 This provision
was recognized and enforced in two of the earlier cases decided
by the Supreme Court.44 Despite this, in a subsequent case the
statutory provision was overlooked, and the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff who instituted suit in forma pauperis could not
be condemned to pay the costs when his demand was rejected. 45
This decision was followed subsequently by the Supreme Court,46
and in fourteen subsequent decisions by the intermediate ap-
pellate courts.47 In Coulon v. Anthony Hamlin, Inc.,48 the Court
of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans refused to follow these
later cases, expressing "tremendous timidity" in suggesting that
the statutory provision had been overlooked therein. Under a
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the
applicability of the statutory provision, affirmed the judgment
of the court of appeal, and at least inferentially overruled the
later cases in which the statutory provision had been over-
looked.49
When a district court has no official court reporter, and
the plaintiff sues in forma pauperis, it is the duty of the clerk to
take down the testimony offered by the parties at the trial in
long hand, or to assign a deputy to do so.5° The ineffectiveness
42. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5059 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1959). The contrary result obtains under federal practice. Rule 6(a)
Federal Rules of Civ. Procedure.
43. LA. R.S. 13:4528 (1950).
44. Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939) ; White v. Walker, 136
La. 464, 67 So. 332 (1915). The same result was reached in Fulton Bag & Cotton
Mills v. Fernandez, 165 So. 476 (La. App. 1936) and Singleton v. First Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 157 So. 620 (La. App. 1934).
45. Causey v. Opelousas-St. Landry Securities Co., 192 La. 677, 188 So. 739
(1939).
46. Hicks v. Royal Indemnity Co., 229 La. 536, 86 So.2d 183 (1956).
47. These fourteen cases are cited in Coulon v. Anthony Hamlin, Inc., 93 So.2d
557 (La. App. 1957).
48. 93 So.2d 557 (La. App. 1957).
49. Coulon v. Anthony Hamlin, Inc., 233 La. 798, 98 So.2d 193 (1957).
50. Williamson v. Enterprise Brick Co., 190 La. 415, 182 So. 556 (1938).
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of this solution of the problem is obvious to any one who has
ever tried a lawsuit. In Hartford v. Mobley5' the twenty-six
plaintiffs sued in forma pauperis for damages for the desecra-
tion of graves of relatives, and prayed for jury trials. After
joinder of issue, the plaintiffs moved to have the consolidated
cases assigned for trial at the earliest convenient date. Since
counsel for the plaintiffs insisted that the clerk of court have
the testimony offered at the trial taken and transcribed by a
court stenographer, and the court had no official reporter, the
trial judge denied the motion. He further indicated that he
would assign the case for trial, and order the clerk to provide
a court stenographer, only when compelled to do so by the Su-
preme Court, and after the latter had answered the questions
posed as to who would pay the cost thereof, the fees of witnesses
called, and the per diem of the jurors. The plaintiffs applied to
the Supreme Court for a mandamus to coerce the trial judge
into granting their motion.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court made the al-
ternative mandamus previously issued peremptory insofar as it
required the trial judge to assign the case for trial at the earliest
convenient date, but otherwise recalled the alternative writ. The
Supreme Court recognized the duty of the clerk of the trial
court to take down the testimony offered at the trial in long
hand, but held that he was under no duty to employ a court
stenographer for such purpose. In answer to the questions posed
by the trial judge, the Supreme Court held that it was the duty
of the parish to advance the fees of witnesses and the per diem
of jurors when the plaintiff sued in forma pauperis and de-
manded a trial by jury. Under the provisions of the Forma Pau-
peris Act the Supreme Court had no alternative to its decision.
Yet this provides only a theoretical solution of the problem. No
actual solution will be available until the legislature requires the
police juries of all parishes to provide in their annual budgets
an amount sufficient to advance the fees and other expenses of
court stenographers, witnesses, and jurors in forma pauperis
cases.
Probably the toughest nut which the Supreme Court has had
to crack in years was the problem presented to it in Cipriano v.
Sherman.52 The writer emerges from days of mulling over the
case as dubitante as Frankfurter, J.
51. 233 La. 956, 98 So.2d 250 (1957).
52. 234 La. 60, 99 So.2d 23 (1958).
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In the original case arising out of this controversy the plain-
tiff sued his vendor, the contractor who built the house, the
latter's subcontractor, and the sureties of the two latter for
damages caused by a fire in his home which resulted from a
heating plant which had either been defective when installed, or
had been installed in a defective manner. 3 This suit was a
cumulation in the alternative of two actions: a primary demand
against plaintiff's vendor based on the implied warranty of the
property sold; and, alternatively, a demand against the con-
tractor, subcontractor, and their sureties based on their delictual
responsibility for the installation of the defective heating plant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rendered judgment for the plain-
tiff on his primary demand and, of course, rejected his alterna-
tive demand. The successful plaintiff applied for a rehearing
in which he asserted that his judgment against his vendor was
worthless, as it had been out of business for years, and pressed
his alternative demand upon the Supreme Court again.5 4 This
application for a rehearing was denied.
Plaintiff then instituted another suit against the contractor,
subcontractor, and their sureties, presenting again his demand
for damages based on their delictual responsibility for the in-
stallation of the defective heating plant. The defendants ex-
cepted on the grounds that the plaintiff's action was barred by
prescription and by the judgment rendered in the first case,
and that his petition disclosed no right or cause of action. The
trial court maintained the exceptions of res judicata and pre-
scription and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the defendants filed further exceptions of no right
and no cause of action in the appellate court, based on the con-
tention that the plaintiff originally had two inconsistent rem-
edies available, and that since he had elected to recover judg-
ment against his vendor, he had waived his action ex delicto.
These exceptions were maintained by the Supreme Court.
The initial point which troubles the writer is his inability to
understand why the plaintiff sued the two sets of defendants
originally in the alternative, instead of joining all in a single
demand for a solidary judgment. Assuming that the plaintiff
had a cause of action against the contractor, subcontractor, and
53. Cipriano v. Superior Realty & Construction Corp., 228 La. 1065, 84 So.2d
922 (1956).
54. See 234 La. 60, 64, 99 So.2d 23, 24 (1958).
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their sureties (and on this the writer expresses no opinion), it
was not inconsistent with his cause of action against his vendor.
Alternative pleading is an extremely useful procedural device,
but here it appears to have backfired.
The writer's second difficulty is due to his innate prejudice
against the solution of Louisiana procedural problems through
the importation of common law rules. Initially, perhaps, when a
common law concept is employed by our courts for the decision
of a case, a just result may be reached. But the long odds are
that the same just result might have been reached through the
application of our own basic principles of procedure, without
having to pay the future price of accepting concepts which are
alien to our system and which eventually will be found to be
unworkable. We have such an instance here. The common law
doctrine of election of remedies is a product of the era when a
law suit was regarded as a duel between skilled protagonists,
and is an unnecessary concession to the inexorable logic of com-
mon law procedure. We never needed to borrow this doctrine,
as the purpose for which it has been employed is better served
by the simpler civilian doctrine of concurrence of actions, based
upon an analogical extension of the rules governing cumulation
of actions. 55
The result reached in this case appears to the writer, after
considerable vacillation, to be the proper one. In the abstract it
might appear that if the plaintiff had a cause of action against
these defendants he should be able to recover judgment against
them. However, the situation which confronted the plaintiff in
the second suit is the product of his own procedural strategy.
Further, he has put these defendants to the trouble and expense
of a complete trial of the case in the lower court, and a full
argument of the case on appeal. Under these circumstances, the
result reached in the case does not appear to be unjust.
While the writer has never been able to dispel all of his
doubts on the subject, it appears to him that the defendants'
exception of res judicata should have been maintained. 56
55. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term -
Oivil Procedure, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 184, 198-199 (1952).
56. All of the requirements of res judicata appear to be satisfied completely,
except possibly the initial rule of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870) that "The au-
thority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was the object
of the judgment." The writer believes that one of the objects of the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court in the first suit was the rejection of the plaintiff's
alternative demand.
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